
The National Tribune.

ONE DOLLAR A YEAR.

WASHINGTON, D. C., THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 11, 1904.

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A Critical History of Operations in Virginia, Maryland and Pennsylvania from the Commencement to the Close of the War, 1861-1865.

Ly WILLIAM SWINTON.

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went down to Yorktown, examined its line

of defences, and urged the military authorities at Richmond to withdraw the force

from the Peninsula. Assuming that the

the navy, reduce the fort at Yorktown,

works at Yorktown he found very defec

"STRIDE OF A GIANT."

Transfer of the Army of the Potomac to the Peninsula-Strategy of the Opposing Commanders-Opening the Campaign-Praise and Blame for McClellan-Sumner's Mistakes-Forcing the Line of the Warwick thus open

To take up an army of over 100,000 men, Johnston regarded the capture of any force transport it and all its immense material remaining thereon as almost certain. The by water, and plant it down on a new theative (though the position was naturally ter of action nearly 200 miles distant, is strong); for, owing to the paucity of enan enterprise the details of which must be gineers, resulting from the employment of studied ere its colossal magnitude can be so many of this class of officers in other adequately apprehended. (1) It was an undertaking eminently characteristic of the direction of civil and railroad engiwhich it executes great material enter-prises—a people rich in resources and in the faculty of creating resources. Yet, when one reflects that at the time the order was given to provide transportation for the army to the Peninsula—the 27th of February, 1862—this had first of all to created; and when one learns that in a little over a month from that date there had been chartered and assembled no fewer than 400 steamers and sailing craft, and that upon them had been transported from Alexandria and Washington to Fortress Monroe an army of 121,500 men. 14,592 animals, 44 batteries, and the waggraph materials, and enormous, equipage for an army of such magnitu goes of which were saved), an intelligent verdict must certainly second the asser-tion of the Assistant Secretary of War, Mr. Tucker, whose administrative talent, in concert with Gen. McClellan, directed ast undertaking, that "for economy is without a parallel on record." An Euro-The van of the grand army was led by Hamilton's—afterward Kearny's—Division of the Third Corps (Heintzelman's), which embarked for Fortress Monroe on the 17th of March. It was followed by Porter's Division on the 22d, and the other division to the division of the 22d, and the other division to the division of the second transfer of t sions took their departure as rapidly as transports could be supplied. Gen. Mc-Clellan reached Fortress Monroe on the 2d

put in motion in the direction of York-town, in front of which the remainder of

The region known as "the Peninsula," ed, is an isthmus formed by the York and the James Rivers, which, rising in the heart of Virginia, and running in a southand 50 miles long. The country is low and flat, in some places marshy, and gen-erally wooded. The York River is formed of the Army of the Potomac, is on the left bank of the James, at the head of naviga-tion, and by land is distant 75 miles from

of April, and by that time there had ar-

rived five divisions of infantry, three regi-ments of cavalry, the artillery division,

and artillery reserve—making in all 58,000 men and 100 guns. This force was at once

ADVANCE IN TWO COLUMNS. From Fortress Monroe the advance was made in two columns—Gen. Keyes with the Fourth Corps (divisions of Couch and Smith) formed the left; and Gen. Heintzel-Officer Goldsborough for the cooperation of man with the Third Corps (divisions of Fitz-John Porter and Hamilton, with Averells cavalry) and Sedgwick's Division of the Second Corps, the right. At the very outset the roads were found nearly impracticable, the season being unusually wet. No resistance of moment was met force in the rear of Gloucester Point, turnthe march; but on the afternoon of the 5th of April the advance of each column was brought to a halt—the right in front of Yorktown and the left by the enemy's works at Lee's Mill. These obstructions formed part of the general defensive line of the Warwick River, which Gen. Magruder had taken up, and which stretched across the isthmus from the York to the James, an extent of 131-2 miles. The Confederate left was formed by the fort Confederate left was formed by the fort at Yorktown, the water batteries of which, with the guns at Gloucester Point, on the opposite bank of the York, barred the passage of that river; the right, by the works on Mulberry Island, which were prolonged to the James. Warwick River, running nearly across the Peninsula from river to river, and emptying into the James, heads

So soon as his antagonist's movement had become fully developed, Gen. Johnston put his army in motion from the Rapidan toward Richmond, where for a time he kept it in hand. The Confederate leader did not expect to hold the Peninsula; for both he and Gen. Lee, who then held the position of chief of staff to Mr. Davis, are position of the views and counsels of Gen. Johnston I derive from himself. It is noteworthy that McClellan expected to do precisely what his antagonist assumed he would do—reduce York-town by the aid of the navy, and give

tion must commonly be disastrous. The President, who found himself by virtue of his office made Commander-in-Chief of all the forces of the United States, and who had, since the supersedure of McClellan as General-in-Chief, assumed a species of general direction of the war, had passed his life in the arena of politics; and he brought the habits of a politician to affairs in which, unfortunately, their intrusion can only result in a confusion of all signed; but on the very day he arrived bethat govern military affairs, is strikingly mand. illustrated in a sentence of one of Mr. Lincoln's dispatches to Gen. McClellan about Clellan. "To me," says he,

the course may be in politics, it is fatal in war, and is precisely that once-honored Austrian principle of "covering everything, by which one really covers nothing." War by which one really covers nothing." War is not in place of "one up the York River; and the variety one up the York River; and the variety is partial and imperious, and in place of having "regard to all points," neglects under discussion was assuredly with the Army of the Potomac confronting the main force of the enemy. The proof of this was not long in declaring itself.

THE LEE'S MILL AFFAIR. Thus deprived of the two auxiliaries or which he had counted, Gen. McClellan judged that there remained but one alternative—either to break the Confederate lines of the Peninsula, if a weak spot could American genius, and of a people distin-guished above all others for the ease with ston wished to withdraw everything from tions against Yorktown, of the nature of a

> E UNION REBEL

SKETCH OF THE LINES AT YORKTOWN.

easterly direction, empty into Chesapeake ston went down and personally took com-Bay. It is from seven to 15 miles wide mand.

UNHELPED BY NAVY.

In his plans for forcing the enemy's de-fenses, there were two auxiliaries on which Gen. McClellan had confidently counted, by the confluence of the Mattapony and Pamunkey, which unite at West Point. Richmond, the objective of the operations work of the operation of carrying York-town. The first of these auxiliaries was the navy, by the aid of whose powerful armament he designed to demolish the water-batteries at Yorktown and Gloucester Point, and then push a force upon West Point, at the head of the York River, the navy, he was informed by that officer that no naval force could be spared for that purpose, since he regarded the works

force in the rear of Gloucester Point, turn-Yorktown by that method, and opening up the York River. This task he had assigned to McDowell's Corps, which was to be the last to embark at Alexandria, and which should execute this operation in case the army found itself brought to a halt by the peninsula defenses. But on the very day on which the army arrived before York-town, Gen. McClellan was met by an or-der (4) of the President, to which reference has already been made, detaching Mc-Dowell's Corps from his command, and re-

nearly across the Peninsula from river to river, and emptying into the James, heads within a mile of Yorktown. Its sources were commanded by the guns of that fort, and its fords had been destroyed by dams defended by detached redoubts, the approaches to which were through dense forests and swamps. Very imperfect or inaccount and interest of the army, and the true character of the position had to be developed by recomnoissances made under fire.

The Confederate defense of the peninsula proaches to Richmond had, almost fire the Peninsula, under Gen. Magruder. When the Army of the Potomac Carried away in ships to the volume of the army, and the true character of the position had to be developed by recomnoissances made under fire.

The Confederate defense of the peninsula approach to Richmond had, almost fire the Peninsula, under Gen. Magruder. When the Army of the Potomac landed at Fortiers of the Peninsula, under Gen. Magruder. When the Army of the Potomac handed at Fortiers of the Peninsula, under Gen. Magruder. When the Army of the Potomac handed at Fortiers of the Peninsula, under Gen. Magruder. When the Army of the Potomac handed at Fortiers of the Peninsula, under Gen. Magruder. When the Army of the Potomac handed at Fortiers of the potomac handed at Fortiers of Hampton Roads, barred the mouth of the true secret of war, to know the Army of the Potomac handed at Fortiers of Hampton Roads, barred the mouth of the true secret of war, to know the Army of the Potomac handed at Fortiers of Hampton Roads, barred the mouth of the true secret of war, to know the Army of the Potomac handed at Fortiers of Hampton Roads, barred the mouth of the true secret of war, to know the Army of the Potomac canned the Army of the Potomac on the Peninsula, thus end the Army of the Potomac on the Peninsula, thus enabling the true the proper of the defense of Hampton Roads, barred the mouth of the true secret of war, to know the Army of the Potomac landed at Fortiers of Hampton Roads, barred the mouth of the true secret of war, to kno

the position of chief of staff to Mr. Davis, pronounced it untenable. Soon after the advent of the Union army, Gen. Johnston

1 Perhaps the last light in a light in

tion of all available forces around Richmond, and there deliver decisive battle. (2) These views were, however, overruled, and it was determined to hold Yorktown at least until Huger should have dismantled the fortifications at Norfolk, destroyed the naval establishment, and evacuated the seaboard—a step that was now felt to be a military necessity. To carry out this policy, in view of which it was determined to hold the lines of Yorktown as long as practicable, reenforcements were from time to football. Thought had been discovered about the center of the line, near Lee's Mill, where there was a dam covered by a battery; and with the view of determining the actual strength of this position, Gen. W. F. Smith, commanding the Second Division of the Fourth Corps, was ordered to push a strong reconnoissance over the Warwick at that point. Under cover of a heavy artillery fire from 18 guns, under Capt. Ayres, four companies of Vermont troops passed the practicable, reenforcements were from time. tion of all available forces around Rich-| thought had been discovered about the cenpracticable, reenforcements were from the to time sent forward from the army at the rifle-trenches held by the Confederates as an advanced line. Here they were reenforced by eight additional companies. The enemy, upon being driven from the front line, retired to a redoubt in the rear, and there receiving a reinforcement, made a counter charge on the handful of Union troops, who were driven across the creek, after holding the rifle pits for an hour, entirely unsupported. Many were killed and wounded in recrossing the stream. (6) No subsequent attempt was made to break the

YORKTOWN EVACUATED.

a task to which the army at once settled down. Depots were established at Shipping Point, to which place supplies were brought direct by water; and indeed it was necessary to avoid land transportation as much as possible—the roads being so few and so bad as to necessitate the construction of an immense amount of corduroy highway. The first parallel was opened at about a mile from Yorktown; and under its protection, batteries were established almost simultaneously along the whole front, extending from York River on the right to the Warwick on the left along a cord of about one mile in length. In all, 14 batteries and three redoubts, fully armed and including some approximation. heavy metal, such as 100- and 200-pounders, were erected to operate in the reduction of the earthworks. The batteries as completed were, with a single exception (7) not allowed to open, as it was believed that the return fire would interfere with the labor on other works. It was preferred labor on other works. It was preferred to wait till the preparations should be complete, and then open a simultaneous and overwhelming bombardment. This period would have been reached by the 6th of

5. McClellan: Report, p. 106. 6. Magruder's Official Report: Confederate Reports of Battles, p. 515. 7. The exception was in the case of what was called Battery No. 1, which on one occasion opened on the wharf at Yorktown to prevent the enemy's receiving artillery

3. McClellan: Report, p. 79. It is due to say that Commodore Goldsborough profice of the cooperation of a naval force, proposed to transport an army of 150,000 men in 4,000 vessels from Boulogne to the English coast. As a military operation, there is, of course, no comparison to be made, because the Army of the Potomac laid at Fortress Monroe an assured base in advance. It is simply as a material entering entering that there is a similarity. These nates are given in the collection of Menoirs dictated to Montholon and Gours dictated to M

of civilians in the war-councils of a nation must commonly be disastrous. The judgment passed on the operations

sion can only result in a confusion of all just relations. This antagonism between the maxims that govern politics and those coln's dispatches to Gen. McClellan about this time. Referring to McClellan's repeated requests that McDowell's force should be sent him, the President says: "I shall aid you all I can consistently with my riew of due regard to all points." (5) Nothing could be more ingenuous than this avowal of the policy of an equitable distribution of favors. But, however discret made rapid and brilliant operations impossible. It was not campaign. It made rapid and brilliant operations impossible. will be equally clear as to the ill-judged policy—to put it at the mildest—which, at er's hands a corps destined for a duty so important. But it is not entirely clear that "rapid and brilliant operations" were not ztill feasible. Gen. McClellan before he began the siege had with him a force of \$20.000 men and it may be queried whether he could not from this force have still detached a corps of 25,000 men to execute the movement designed for McDowell. The holding of his line in front of Yorktown line of seven or eight miles-would, to make it secure against offensive action or the enemy's part, require about 40,000 men. Now, the detachment of a column of 25,000 would still have left him 55,000 men. Moreover, one division of McDowell's Corps—that of Franklin, 11,000 strong—did actually reach McClellan while

form. Subsequently, however, he conclud-ed that it was unequal to the work. But, reinforced by another division, might it not have been sufficient? In proof of this it may be pointed out that, on the retreat of Johnston from Yorktown, Franklin's Division (9) alone was assigned to a sim-ilar and equally difficult duty—to move on the flank of the Confederate army by

however, was on garrison was compelled," says he, "to place in Gloucester Point, Yorktown, and Mulberry Island, fixed garrisons, amounting to 6,000 men. So that it will be seen that the balance of my line, embracing a length of 13 miles, was defended by about 5,000 men." (10) It appears that Gen. Magruder fully expected, after the preliminary reconnoissances, that a serious attack would be made; and in this expectation his man cleant in the transless and under a reconnoise. men slept in the trenches and under arms.
"To my surprise," he adds, "he [McClellan] permitted day after day to pass without an assault. In a few days, the object of his delay was apparent. In every direction in front of our lines the control of tion in front of our lines, through the inter-vening woods, and along the open fields, earthworks began to appear. Through the energetic action of the Government, reinforcements began to pour in and each hour the Army of the Peninsufa grew stronger and stronger, until anxiety passed from my mind as to the the result of an attack upon

It is possible, however—and there is a considerable volume of evidence bearing upon this point—that Gen. McClellan, durupon this point—that Gen. McClellan, during all the earlier portion of the month before Yorktown, had it in his mind, even with McDowell's Corps, to undertake the decisive turning movement by the north side of the York. In this event, it would not only be in the direction of his plan to make no attack, but it would play into his bands that his opponent should accumulate his forces on the Peninsula, Yet this halting between two opinions had the result that, when he had abandoned the purpose of making the turning movement, it had become too late for him to make a direct attack—"all anxiety" as to the result of which had by that time "passed from the mind" of his opponent. From subsequent evidence, it would appear that a movement, not with the view of assaulting the fortifications of Yorktown (that would have been a bloody enterprise), but of breaking the a bloody enterprise), but of breaking the line of the Warwick, thus investing York-town, if not compelling its immediate evacuation, was an operation holding out a reasonable promise of success. (12)

GRACE VALUABLE TO REBELS. It was not, indeed, a certain operation, for the impracticable character of the country made the handling of troops very diffi-But just in proportion as time was valuable to him was the obligation imposed on Gen. McClellan of not allowing him this time. It is now known that the Confederate Government made good use of the month of grace allowed it by the siege of Yorktown; for not only were vigorous military measures taken, but at this very period the Confederate Congress passed the first conscription act, which gave Mr. Davis absolute control of the military resources of the

The proper method of meeting this was 9. Franklin's division reached the Peninsula on the 22d of April, 1

10. Magruder's Official Report: Confederate Reports of Battles, p. 546.

11. Ibid., p. 517,

12. Gen. Heintzelman, in his evidence be-

12. Gen. Heintzelman, in his evidence before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, states it as his impression that, had he been allowed, he could have carried the line of the Warwick. "I think," says he, "if I had been permitted what I first landed on the Peninsula to advance, I could have isolated the troops in Morktown, and the place would have fallen as a few days; but my orders were very attainent not to the place would have fallen as a few days; but my orders were very stringent not to make any demonstration. I supposed, when I first got there that we could force the enemy's lines at about Wym's Mills, isolate Yorktown, so as to prevent the enemy from reinforcing it, when it would have fallen in the course of a little while." Report on the Conduct of the War, vol. i, p. 247

professional nature, that the interference founded less on the intrinsic merits of the Sport Mistories of Notable Regiments By COL. WM. F. FOX.

SECOND CONNECTICUT HEAVY ARTILLERY:

UPTON'S BRIGADE - WRIGHT'S DIVISION - SIXTH CORPS.

(1) COL. LEVERETT W. WESSELLS. (2) Col. ELISHA S. KELLOGG (Killed).

(3) COL. RANALD S. MACKENZIE, EE. B., B. S.; BRIG. GEN. U. S. A. (4) COL. JAMES HUBBARD; BYT. BRIG. GEN.

Companies.	KILLED AND DIED OF WOUNDS.			DIED OF DISEASE, ACCIDENTS, IN PRISON, &c.			Total
	Officers.	Men.	· Total.	Officers.	Men.	Total.	Euroliment.
Field and Staff							17
Company A	3	29	32		12	12	200
В	3 2	31	33		14	14	207
C	1	19	20	1	21.	22	208
D	1	30	31		- 15	15	204
E	1	35	36	1.	17	. 18	237
F	•				17	17	198
G	•	9 16	16	2.00	17	- 17	195
il	1	9 .	10	and the late	13	13	207
1		21	21		15	15	201
K	•	29 8	29		15	15	178
L	1	8	9	100	9	9	229
М	•	6	6	•	5	5	216
Totals	12	242	254	2	171	173	2,506

254 killed - 10.1 per cent. Total of killed and wounded. 882.

	CAS THAT SALE STATE WASHING	() [2] [2] [2] [2] [2] [2] [2] [2] [2] [2]	
BATTLES.	K. & M.W.	BATTLES. K. & M.	v
icket, North Anna, Va	1 1	Fisher's Hill, Va	
Ianovertown, Va	. 2	Cedar Creek, Va	4
Cold Harbor, Va., June 1, 1864	129	Hatcher's Run, Va	
Cold Harbor Trenches, Va	4	Petersburg, Va., March 25, '65	
iege of Petersburg, Va	. 8	Fall of Petersburg, Va	
erusalem Road, Va	10	Sailor's Creek, Va	
Dequon, Va	36	Place Unknown	
15 18 18 19 19 19 19 19 19		(H. B. H.	

Present, also, at Fort Stevens; Appomattox.

Notes .- Recruited in Litchfield County under the second call for troops, as the Nineteenth Infantry. It left the State September 15, 1862, proceeding to Alexandria, Va., in which vicinity it was stationed during the ensuing year, engaged in garrison duty within the fortifications. In November, 1863, it was changed to a heavy artillery organization, and the additional number of men made necessary thereby were soon recruited and sent forward. On May 17, 1864, it left Alexandria with about 1,600 men, and, acting as infantry, marched to the front, where it was assigned to Upton's (2d) Brigade, Russell's (1st) Division, Sixth Corps. Its first engagement was in the storming of the earth works at Cold Harbor, where its casualties amounted to 85 killed, 221 wounded, and 19 missing; the most of the latter were killed or wounded. In that assault the regiment, about 1,400 strong, led the column with fixed bayonets and uncapped muskets, Colonel Kellogg falling in advance of his men, pierced by several bullets. In the battle at the Opequon the regiment lost 20 killed, and 118 wounded, the killed including Major James Q. Rice and five line officers. Its casualties at Cedar Creek footed up 21 killed, 107 wounded, and 62 missing. The regiment took part in the repulse of the Confederate sortie at Petersburg - March 25, 1865 - and in the closing victories of the war.

SECOND WISCONSIN INFANTRY.

IRON BRIGADE - WADSWORTH'S DIVISION - FIRST CORPS.

(2) Col. EDGAR O'CONNOR, EE. B. (Killed).

(3) COL. LUCIUS FAIRCHILD, B. C. (4) COL. JOHN MANSFIELD.

COMPANIES.	KILLED AND DIED OF WOUNDS.			DIED OF DISEASE, ACCIDENTS, IN PRISON, &c.			Total
	Officers.	Men.	Total.	Officers.	Men.	Total.	Enrollment.
Field and Staff		1	3		1	1	17
Company A		20	20		7	7	121
В		17	19	1	7	7	124
C	. 1	30	31		7	7	132
D		30	15		8	8	.116
E		24	24		7	7	115
F	•	22	22		5	5	107
G		29	29		16	16	135
н	2	26	28		9	9	122
I	2	. 15	17		4	4	101
к	1	29	30	1220	6	6	113
Totals	10	228	s38		77	77	1,203

238 killed - 19.7 per cent. Total of killed and wounded, 753; of missing and captured, 132; died in Confederate prisons (previously included), 17.

	captarea,	aja, died in confederate prisons (previous
BATTLES.	K. & M.W.	Battles.
Blackburn's Ford, Va	·· I I	Wilderness, Va
First Bull Run, Va	25	Spotsylvania, Va., May 10
Catlett's Station, Va	1	Spotsylvania, Va., May 21
Gainesville, Va	86	North Anna, Va
Manassas, Va	1	Petersburg, Va
South Mountain, Md	10	Hatcher's Run, Va
Antietam, Md	30	Gunboat detail
Fredericksburg, Va		Artillery detail
Gettysburg, Pa		

Present, also, at Cedar Mountain; Fitz Hugh's Crossing; Chancellorsville; Mine Run; Bethesda Church; Cold Harbor; Weldon Railroad.

Nores.—This regiment sustained the greatest percentage of loss of any in the entire Union Army. It was a fine regiment and well officered. Leaving the State June 20, 1861, it went to Virginia, where it was brigaded under command of Colonel William T. Sherman, with which command it marched to First Bull Run; its casualties in that battle were 24 killed, 65 wounded, and 23 missing. In August, 1861, it was assigned to the command which afterwards became so famous as "The Iron Brigade of the West." This brigade, under General Gibbon. encountered hard fighting at Manassas (1862), in which the regiment lost 53 killed, 213 wounded, and 32 missing,—a total of 298. Nearly all these casualties occurred at Gainesville, where the opposing lines faced each other at a distance of 75 paces; Colonel O'Connor was killed there. The loss at Antietam was 19 killed and 67 wounded; at Gettysburg, 26 killed, 155 wounded, and 52 missing; Colonel Fairchild lost an arm at Gettysburg, Lieutenant-Colonel George H. Stevens was killed, and the casualties in the regiment amounted to 77 per cent. of those present. The Second fought at the Wilderness and at Spotsylvania, after which it was detailed as a provost-guard, having become reduced to less than 100 men present for duty, with both field officers wounded and in the hands of the enemy. On June 11, 1864, it was ordered home for muster-out, the recruits and reënlisted men having been consolidated into a battalion of two companies, A and B, which were transferred in November to the Sixth Wisconsin.

EDITORIAL NOTE: The above pages are reproduced from Col. Fox's famous book, "Regimental Losses." Other pages, giving short histories of notable regiments, will appear from week to week. It is hoped the appearance of these short histories will stimulate comrades to send in material for the preparation of more complete histories of their respective regiments than have yet appeared.
